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Genuine Process Logic  
Abstract:  
The Genuine Process Logic described here (abbreviation: GPL) places the object-bound process 
itself at the center of formalism. It should be suitable for everyday use, i.e. it is not primarily in-
tended for the formalization of computer programs, but instead, as a counter-conception to the 
classical state logics. The new and central operator of the GPL is an action symbol replacing the 
classical state symbols, e.g. of equivalence or identity. The complete renunciation of object-lan-
guage state expressions also results in a completely new metalinguistic framework, both regarding 
the axioms and the expressive possibilities of this system. A mixture with state logical terms is 
readily possible.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 The starting situation 
Among the many logical systems, the best known of which are propositional logic, syllogistics, predicate 
and quantifier logic, and modal logic, there are also a few for the logical mapping of process sequences.1 
The approaches developed in this area include, for example, the so called ‘Propositional Dynamic Logic’ 
(PDL), ‘Second Order Process Logic’ (SOAPL), ‘Algorithmic Logic’ or simply ‘Process Logic’. In addition, a 
formalized process theory was developed somewhat later2, which does not, however, understand itself 
as strictly logical formalism. All these approaches have in common the fact that they build on the basic 
model of classical propositional logic or even a form of modal logic and understand themselves as their 
extension.3 In this sense, such statement systems have been designed as sequences of state symbols4 
linked by so-called 'paths’, i.e. connectives between the designated states. The process theory of Ger-
hard Wunsch also builds on this scheme, but derives from the concept of physical state space rather 
than that of a logical system. Further, the purpose of all these theories or logical systems is practical in a 
more specific sense. The said process logics are about the modeling of the behavior of computers, not 
about everyday human thinking. Therein, the process logics developed so far differ significantly not only 
from the traditional syllogistic and the quasi-mathematical systems of modern propositional and predi-
cate logic, as originally developed by Peano, Frege, Russell / Whitehead and various later authors. By 
modeling logical statements, these founders of modern logic basically wanted to clarify the cognitive 
orientation of man in everyday life, especially by attempting to eliminate ambiguities in natural lan-
guages. 
1.2 The specific application field of the GPL 
The approach described below with the abbreviated designation 'GPL' tries to restore this connection of 
formal process logic to the thinking of people in everyday life by means of explicit formalization of the 
procedure itself. The chosen designation as 'genuine process logic' merely serves to distance it from the 
                                                          
1 See the summarizing account of Harel et al. [1982] and Knijnenburg et al. [1991] with numerous further refer-
ences especially to the predecessors of the theoretical approach developed there. An up-to-date summary of the 
state of research in this field is offered by Troquard / Balbiani [2015]. 
2 See Wunsch [2000] as a standard reference in this field. 
3 Knijnenburg explicitly says: „The meaning of the propositional connectives is exactly like in ordinary, classical 
propositional logic […]“ (Knijnenburg et al. [1991], S. 183). Harel et al. in turn understand their approach as an ex-
tension of classical modal logic, see Harel et al., p. 144 (abstract and beginning of the essay). 
4 The text follows in the naming of symbol categories the usual convention, extended by the newly introduced cat-
egory of the action operators, the availability, merger and splitting symbols (more details in the following text): 
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above-mentioned, more technically oriented process logics of the 1980s.5 Thereby the GPL wants to re-
cover what was lost by their almost exclusively technical orientation, i.e. by their effort to optimize com-
puter programs.6 The motivation for such a project results from the conviction that the individual in eve-
ryday life primarily thinks and acts in a procedural manner and must do so to cope with the often highly 
dynamic reality of life. 7 This should apply culturally invariant. Even animals which at least for the most 
part, if not generally, cannot formulate concepts of their reality are obviously orientated in their habi-
tats with astonishing precision and probability of success. In the flow of everyday life animals as well as 
humans think only secondarily in states, primarily in processes.8 In doing so, we first analytically reflect 
on the current events, trying to apprehend their elementary process units. From the relevance of these 
elementary processes within the overall event, we infer to follow-up processes and events.  
Of course, defining states also plays an important role in our cognition, but only a secondary, cultur-
ally mediated one. These states become socially important, especially in the normative sphere and com-
munication of promises, obligations, contracts, laws, etc. Statements of state serve, in the context of so-
cial order, above all the fulfillment and control of behavioral expectations.9 The individual being, animals 
as well as humans, usually needs explicit state determinations only as a complementary means. They 
may serve as clues for orientation, for example when one keeps in mind where one puts an object to 
find it later. However, the flowing everyday life takes place before and with us primarily in a procedural 
way. The question is, therefore, how such a deal with reality can be formally modeled.  
The GPL differs insofar significantly from both the initially named process logics as the basis of com-
puter algorithms (in the following: program logics) as well as from the well-known classical state logics, 
as it is intended to represent reality directly as a chain of events or processes. Afterwards, these can be 
connected again to each other by object states. In order to distinguish the GPL typologically from the 
classical state logics and the former process logics, which are also ultimately state logic, it must be un-
derstood as a pure logic of action (synonymously for ‘action’: of processes or events). 
Nevertheless, the GPL is state-logically connectable at every point of a sequence of expressions 
formed with it: an inference of the GPL can readily serve as a starting point for further state-logical 
transformations, and conversely any state-logical result can be used without difficulty as a starting point 
for further developments in the GPL (see below section 8). This does not mean, however, that the GPL is 
basically just an extension of the known state logics with some additional operators. As will be shown 
                                                          
5 The referred process logics of the 1980s do not describe processes in themselves as changes, but as sequences of 
machine states. In their depiction, the computer "jerks" from state to state according to its program until a goal is 
reached. In this context, it should not be a coincidence that the peak of interest in algorithmic process logic was 
reached approximately between 1975 and 1990. During this period, the founding of today's so-called 'digital revo-
lution' took place, ie. the technical and thus necessarily formal development of strictly state-logically operating 
computer programs. 
6 All the programming languages used today are based, as far as their logical foundations are concerned, exclu-
sively on state logic functions and structures. This is particularly evident in the control structures of the OPL dis-
cussed in Section 7 compared to those of the usual programming languages. 
7 See Cauley [1986] and Stadler [1989]. Although Kathleen Cauley, from her state of knowledge at that time, ar-
gues that logical knowledge differs from procedural and conceptual knowledge. She says: „Procedural knowledge 
refers to the task specific rules, skills, actions and sequences of action employed to reach goals. It shares no fea-
tures with logical knowledge except occasional qualitative change.“ (ibid., p. 4). However, this difference should be 
abolished precisely by the present draft by bringing purely procedural knowledge into a formal logical form. 
8 I claim this without being able to refer to a study devoted to this question. Surprisingly, I could find none that ex-
plicitly addresses this issue. 
9 Humans are the only living entities able to distinguish between the normatively expected and the actual run of 
events by means of symbolic representation. However, they need state determinations to be able to match such 
snapshots of reality with their normative conceptions. Animals do this, if at all, not based on the comparison of 
concrete mental images of what they wish to realize with the real tenor, but based on preconscious and thus by 
themselves uncontrollable cognitive functions. – In the legal sphere, the focus is on states, especially in the so 
called subsumption technique, which every student of continental European law eagerly learns. 
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below, the GPL is fundamentally neither of situational states nor of object properties. It deals exclusively 
with effects. Consequently, a connection from the GPL to any state logic and vice versa always requires a 
'translation' of states or object properties into action parameters. Examples are given later in Section 8: 
Coupling of process-logical and state-logical expressions. 
The cognitive and consequently also formally great importance of state-logical systems should by no 
means be diminished. The process-logical formalism developed here does not see itself as a competitor 
but as an addition to the well-known state-logical systems.10 Both are abstractions of reality, each with 
its own kind of validity claim. Thus, results of state-logical transformations and inferences can serve as a 
starting point for process-logical continuations of the modeling of reality and vice versa.  
1.3 Differences of the GPL to the classical state logics 
The most obvious difference between the GPL and all other so-called state logics, apart from the differ-
ent character set, is that the GPL does not operate on either two-valued or multivalued truth values. 
State statements and truth values are inseparable. Truth values unfold their effect in a logical formalism 
only in the context of state determinations. This does not apply to process statements, although one 
could also qualify process statements in this regard. However, this would compromise the essence of 
process-logical structures. The logical content of procedural statements is not in their evaluation, e.g. as 
true or false, but in the specific procedural consistent relationship of these statements to each other. 
Thus, we are dealing here with a slightly different meaning of the term ‘logical consistency’.11  
The corresponding reservation also applies to the known modal and temporal logics.12 Certainly, pro-
cess or event expressions can only be understood as something that takes place in time. However, this 
does not mean that time-indexed statements are already genuine event statements, nor that a strict 
process logic in the sense of the GPL must provide their statements about times with truth values. 
In addition, the elementary, classical state logics, following their premises, regularly lead to an 
equally state-bound inferential conclusion. Consequently, state logical sequences of expression - after 
the initial establishment of the state-bound premises - consist of their combination and transformation 
to infer a logically final state. In the GPL, by contrast, this looks quite different, in this respect like the 
program logics mentioned above. Process logics in general, including the GPL, do not rely on any static 
inference, but use their linguistic means for the general and purely formal modeling of dynamic struc-
tures. As a result, any valid expression following a preceding expression may theoretically also be con-
sidered as a conclusion. In the stronger sense of the word, a process-logical conclusion would be only 
one envisaged from the outset as the aim of a process chain and is then proven valid by its preceding 
and equally validated expression sequence.  
                                                          
10 These include both the classical propositional, predicate, quantifier and modal logics, as well as the process 
logics such as the PDL designed to better control computers. The so-called predicate logic does not deserve its 
name, because grammatically the predicate is an activity word in all major languages of this world. In traditional 
logics, on the other hand, the (logical) predicate always appears only as an object property, bound to it by the 
grammatical copula. Classical predicate logic would therefore have to be better called 'status logic', 'coincidence 
logic' or something similar, while the term 'predicate logic' in the true sense of the word would belong to the OPL. 
11 It is nonetheless plausible to call this form of being free from symbolic contradictions a form of logical con-
sistency. Logical consistency is nothing more than the formal compatibility of several statements with each other. 
However, this only applies to the object language level. On the other hand, on a metalinguistic level, process logic 
statements would be exclusively two-valued in terms of their consistency, i.e. to be qualified either as consistent 
or not. Tertium non datur. 
12 Temporal logics are known to belong to the group of modal logics. Although it is possible in the temporal logics 
by introducing modal operators to change the truth value of a statement over different points in time and thus, for 
example, to modify the rigid statement "It is raining" to "It has rained" and "It will rain" etc. However, this does not 
change the fact that such colloquial verb phrases are logically treated here only as states. („It is the case that <sta-
tus statement>).  
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Regarding the extensions of the predicate logic by quantifiers the same applies to the GPL as already 
mentioned above for the truth values: A quantification of process-logical statements does not make 
sense. However, where this is required, the formalism below provides an interface to all known state 
logics (see Section 8 below) so that, if necessary, it is also possible to work on a sequence of statements 
using these means. 
Further innovations of the GPL compared to the designated state logical systems (including the so-
called program logics) relate to the necessity of being able to formally create objects and let them van-
ish as well as to merge or split existing objects. State logic thinking is exclusively combinatorial thinking 
of objects normally given already at the beginning of an expression sequence. Admittedly it is possible 
to deduce new elementary objects from those given in the initial expression sequences. Thus, the prop-
ositional implication allows the logically valid conclusion of p on p → p ∨ q. However, the new object q 
appears here out of nowhere; it is not generated by any of the previously available objects. Furthermore 
there is definitely no state-logical expression and, in particular, no form of inference that leads to the 
merging of two previously separate objects in a single result object. In its conclusion, the expression p ∧ 
q = r is logically not acceptable and thus invalid. Although it is possible to introduce an identity relation-
ship in terms of predicate logic, it does not have a synthesizing effect13, but merely produces a kind of 
state symmetry between two objects or object groups. The same applies vice versa for the splitting of an 
object. 
The merging of several formal objects into new objects or, conversely, the splitting of symbolic units 
into a plurality of subordinate (individual) units is a basic cognitive function of human thought and 
should therefore be reproducible in a dynamic logical formalism.14 In some way this is possible in set 
theory, but not in the state logical systems. Yet set theory, all in all, is a state logical formalism too. In 
contrast, the GPL allows generically the logical formalization of merging and splitting.15  
1.4 An anthropological explanation of the present approach  
If the above assertion is correct that the general cognition of living beings is primarily process- and only 
secondarily state-logically organized, then this argument becomes even stronger in relation to humans 
in that they, while growing up, become state logically intensely trained through linguistically coded 
norms. First and foremost, these abilities enable normative coded social orders. Legal norms are based 
on the possibility of the objective determination of social conditions, because otherwise it was neither 
possible e.g. to determine taxes nor whether a certain behavior falls under a penalty provision or not. 
This may well be a not entirely implausible explanation hypothesis that so far only formalisms have been 
developed in logic, which are state logically organized.  
Social order and logic are closely connected, especially via the respective legal and economic order of 
a society. Social order is based on objective, i.e. generally applicable rules to deal with each other. How-
ever, rules of social interaction can only be applied to hypothetical or established facts. For this, Aristo-
tle found the first formalization already in Greek antiquity.16 That his logical considerations from the be-
ginning favor a state logical form may have something to do with his skeptical relation to the older 
Greek natural philosophy, in particular, Heraclitus’ intuition of the world as pure process and constant 
change. This was suspicious to him. Both in the fourth book of his Physics and in the fourth book of his 
                                                          
13 See e.g. Kutschera/Breitkopf [1971], p. 129. 
14 See the recent contribution by Robert C. Berwick and Noam Chomsky in Berwick / Chomsky [2016]. They charac-
terize this central ability of human cognition as the MERGE function. 
15 See Section 6: Object Merging and Splitting below. 
16 See the Aristotelian Organon (Aristotle [1995], Vol. 1), there the first analysis (doctrine of the conclusion) and 
the second analysis (doctrine of the proof).  
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Metaphysics17 he deals with change by way of physical or developmental movement. Finally, he says 
about nature that it is the principle of movement, and consequently not the movement itself. That is, 
the ground state of the world is the realm of rules; it precedes every change by inner worldly move-
ment.18 Thereby, Aristotle not least set the course also for logic to this day. Only modernity recognizes 
that thinking in state sequences is a distinct and necessary feature of our normative orientation in social 
relations. In the language of Michel Foucault, all forms of state logic are a ‘dispositive of power’19, or less 
polemically: institutions to stabilize social order. 
This is particularly evident in the intimate connection of all social order with a very specific concept 
of truth. Within the framework of modern social order, a statement can only be qualified as true or false 
by way of its review by at least one other authorized person. By contrast, an intuitive concept of truth in 
the sense of unquestionable givenness only for one and the same person is useless for this purpose. 
However, such an intersubjective check is not possible without reference to a 'snapshot' of the respec-
tive flowing situation: The flow of events must be frozen in its crucial aspects to be able to rate it so-
cially. And because this evaluation is done primarily with linguistic means, it is the first task of those in-
volved in such procedures to determine the truth of the statement in question, because false claims are 
disputed discursively from the outset in terms of their content. Hence our not only logical obsession 
with truth. 
By contrast, process-logical thinking in the sense pursued here is closer to individual, primary world 
perception. It is less apodictic in its claim to validity and therefore probably less suitable as a ‘dispositive 
of power’ to use, too. If it serves more to understand the primary capabilities to orient oneself, the bet-
ter. 
That said, we come to the formal part of the GPL. 
2. The notation of the pure process; the positive and the negative action operator 
Despite all the differences mentioned above, the GPL makes use of other systems, here referred to as 
state logical, i.e. of certain conventions in the notation of their terms, which superficially resemble those 
of classical predicate logic. To be sure, they mean something fundamentally different here. Thus, ‘A(p)‘ 
expresses a state in classical predicate logic, namely, that the object p has the property A. On the other 
hand, the term here is intended to mean that p can trigger or cause the event A.  A has no defined prop-
erty in the object language of the GPL, but can be the trigger of an elementary process.20 This may 
sound harmless at first, especially as one can also map processes in classical propositional logic - but 
only as an overall statement, e.g. in the statement "It is raining". The predicate logic does not permit 
this anymore, because it must be understood, following its inventors, as a sentence-analytic construct. 
The classical predicate logic knows only state-descriptive sentences, for example: ‘For the object a, if a is 
an object of type x and all x have the property F, then a also has this property’, in short: ((x ∈ X) ∧ ∀x : 
F(x) ∧ (a ∈ X)) → ∀a : F(a). Now, the classic logical systems deal with statements such as ‘Robert puts on 
                                                          
17 Ibid., 1005bff. In Section 4: Problems around the Law of Contradiction, it is already quite clear how truth values 
of propositions necessarily combine with a state logical reasoning. 
18 Aristotle [1991], Vol. 1, 1015a12. 
19 To my knowledge, Foucault did not contribute explicitly to formal logic. However, he occasionally dealt quite 
well with the role of logic in society; see Schneider [2001], p. 299ff., available on the internet at 
http://ul.qucosa.de/fileadmin/data/qucosa/documents/15195/A45-Foucault-Wahrheitsproduktion.OCR.pdf.  
20 The expression 'p can be the trigger of A' indicates a modal root of the OPL. However, this does not mean that it 
borrows from modal logic formalisms. Rather, the modal aspect of OPL is directly metaphysical, i.e. here a formal 
reflex expresses itself with reference to a corresponding model of the world, imagined as a totality of the given out 
of reality and possibility. This is explicitly directed against the early Wittgenstein, whose sentence 1 of his Tracta-
tus logico-philosophicus reads: "The world is everything that is the case" (Wittgenstein [1993], Vol. 1, p. 11). Appar-
ently, the world is more than that, namely everything that may be the case, too. This is mirrored by the formal de-
sign of the OPL. 
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his jacket’, ‘The fans storm the stage’ or the famous ‘Romeo loves Julia’ at best by taking them as a rela-
tion. Usually however they take it as a statement of an integral state in the grammatical form 'x is y', 
whereby the actual event is being reduced to a state by an auxiliary verb (‘to be’ or ‘to have’) as the cop-
ula. However, that is missing the point. The actual statement tells us something about the particular 
event itself. Therefore, to go beyond this limitation, we need another form of predication and different 
operators. 
2.1 The action object: latent potency and actual effect 
The idea is to depict a possible or real event in a very general and elementary way, and to formally dif-
ferentiate both from each other. Processes, as soon as they occur, always take place within one and the 
same or between several objects and thus present themselves (and only thereby!) as a single process 
between individual objects or in themselves.21 For this, we have to first make a formal provision to be 
able to differentiate between the respective object that operates and its possible effect. Note: this is a 
distinction between the possibility of action and the objects from which they originate, or which are 
their goal. Why this distinction? Well, objects (in the widest sense of the word, including the living be-
ings and especially humans) do not only act at present. Additionally, they are always situated in a possi-
bility horizon that depends on their situation in the interplay with their environment. A bottle standing 
on a table can break if someone pushes it down, but it does not, unless the real conditions are met. This 
is especially relevant when dealing with people. People may reasonably assert that they could do this or 
that, provided the circumstances are met, or we attribute this capability to them, e.g. to justify their le-
gal responsibility. A procedural formalism must therefore consider the important fact that objects can 
be attributed to potential effects in a very general sense, without this effect having to occur immedi-
ately. We refer to this potential form of effect as latent, whereas the actual effect occurs as actual.22  
To formally fulfill this requirement, instead of the traditional state identifier (i.e. the state logic predi-
cate), we need three distinct signs: 
1. Object symbols 
                                                          
21 This is the only extralogical, i.e. metaphysical axiom that is claimed by the OPL. For justification, see Sohst 
[2016], p. 123ff. 
22 Naturally, the OPL also notes process flows line by line using discrete expressions. However, an action expression 
does not stand for a fixed state, but rather for a specific, holistic space of possibility, which changes with each fur-
ther expression. This space of possibility is configured through objective potentials of action, which, for living be-
ings, we might better call capacities. The present approach, however, assumes that a space of possibility desig-
nated by us is only an abstraction within a fundamentally dynamic structure. Only in the language of logical ab-
straction does the term 'space of possibility' designate discrete, single states among others. In fact, i.e. from a pre-
logical or ontological point of view, a space of possibility is necessarily stretched over time. It is semantically mean-
ingful only over its whole temporal extension. Therefore, even the conceptual singular of 'possibility space' is easily 
misunderstood. For the meaning behind this word to become comprehensible to us, we cognitively pick out indi-
vidual moments from the flow of its own constant change. In their pre-linguistic existence, probably all living be-
ings do this. In this broader sense, the GPL is also a kind of second-order state logic, namely a logic of the sequence 
of configurations of the possible as a result of realized dynamics. However, the action latencies given only for the 
logical representation and their updates in the form of discrete actions and their consequent changed states of 
possibility must not be confused with the static attributions of states to objects. The differences that arise from 
this changed perspective are the subject of this text. 
This possibility space, which is modified in each case by an action expression, is defined by the objects given at 
the respective point of the overall process with their possible connecting actions. It behaves as in our everyday 
lives: When we pursue a particular goal, we often come up against alternatives to the achievement of our goals 
and therefore have to decide how to go on. We can consider such branching as process nodes. Each such process 
node, if one traces it with all its execution options in the OPL, would correspond to a single line of expression with 
certain action objects. At each point that requires a decision from us, we reflect newly the possibilities that arise 
from the various path alternatives, and not the current state of the objects around us. Each process node conse-
quently confronts us with a changed possibility space because of the already implemented actions. The OPL is a 
formalism for describing the dynamic development of possibility spaces. 
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2. Latency symbols (for the potential effect of an object) 
3. Action symbols (for the actual effect) 
A complete action expression must therefore always be composed of signs of these three basic 
types. With reference to the state logical notation, we first use the square bracket instead of the round 
to attribute an effect to an object. After all, the expression for a state and a potential for action have in 
common that they are necessarily assigned to the core of an object whose predicate they are. The dif-
ference in parentheses, however, allows the later mixture of both systems of statement without the risk 
of confusion, which expression belongs to which system. The structural similarity of the spelling thus fa-
cilitates a mixture of both systems. For the assignment of a possible action to an object, i.e. for the for-
malization of pure latency, we first only write 
F[a]. 
The Latin capital letter in front of the parenthesis stands for the latent effect, the italic lowercase let-
ter in parenthesis for the affected object. We call such an expression an action object. The object ex-
pression in the bracket can also be multi-digit: 
F[a, b, c]. 
This means that a single potency is assigned to an entire group of objects. We call this an action item 
group. This natural possibility was obviously overlooked in classical predicate logic. In any case it is not 
anywhere formally provided, although it is applicable to state logic systems too. 
However, expressions for action objects or action object groups do not yet describe an actual pro-
cess. They only assign a latent effect to an object. A complete action expression only comes about when 
expanded by the action operator described in 2.2 below. There, too, the question of how to solve ele-
mentary processes, e.g. 'Peter is writing', 'The cat runs', 'It may rain', etc., which are single-digit, while 
many other processes are two- or even many-digit. 
The negation of such a latent potential is expressed by the usual negation sign ‘¬‘, which we call the 
‘negation of potentiality’. From the position of its emergence in a sequence of expressions, it negates 
the further possibility of the denoted effect, i.e. determines its impossibility. The formal meaning of 
such a negation is that the correspondingly denoted object cannot, as a source object, stand in any ex-
pression of effective action with its previously negated power. However, this negation can be reversed 
by another expression. This is also implicitly possible by positing the object in question on the right side 
of an action operator with its corresponding potential, now positively denoted. Note: The negation of 
possibility thus indicated makes use of a different concept of modality than is used in modal logic. In 
modal logic, the term 'possibility' stands on a scale between the extremes of impossibility and necessity. 
Here, on the other hand, the impossibility of an effect removes the denoted latent potency of action 
from the referred object. This form of negation thus refers to the relation of possibility and reality, with 
which modal logic has explicitly nothing to do. 
Action object groups must have a functionally clear relationship to simple action objects to avoid 
confusion. We therefore define their relationship to each other and their internal structure as follows: 
DEF 1: Action object and action object group 
1. The action object is represented by expressions of the form F [a], where 'F' stands for any object-
specific potency and '[a]' stands for any object. By prefixing the expression for the potency, the 
assignment of this potency to the content of the following parenthesis is displayed. 
2. F (the sign of an impact potency) and a (the object sign) are object and action constants. A set-
theoretic generalization in the sense that they are elements of specific sets of effects 
Introduction to the Genuine Process Logic (GPL) – © Wolfgang Sohst / v.20180506  9 
 
(synonymously: impacts) or objects, that is, a second-order effect and object designation, is not 
part of the elementary GPL, which is elementary in this respect. 
3. The square brackets around an object identifier express the area of validity of the effect assigned 
to one or multiple objects. Thus, a pair of square brackets may contain any number of object 
constants separated by commas: F[a, b, c, … n]. Such a construct is called an action object group. 
4. Effect constants are defined within an expression sequence for a specific area of validity. Any use 
deviating from this definition within a sequence of expressions is invalid.  
5. As an exception from the above no. 4, the scope of an action object group only changes in the 
cases that a) an object of the action object group disappears in the further course of an expres-
sion sequence or another object is explicitly included in the group. In the case of the disappear-
ance of an object that previously belonged to an action object group, the referred action object 
group is implicitly reduced by this object. In the case of a new inclusion of an object in an action 
object group, this must be explicitly indicated in a formally correct manner. The formal notation 
for this is: <old action object group> <action operator23> <new action object group>. 
In any case, every expression of the GPL that stands for an action object (group) is, from a colloquial 
perspective, a subject and its predicate, whereby the predicate corresponds indeed to the verb of the 
statement (as in everyday language) and not, as in the state logic, only to the property of a substance. 
However, the expression F [a] in the GPL does not mean that the object kernel a actually has some ob-
ject property in the form of a static action potential, but only that this object kernel a may have the ef-
fect F within the given logical scope. Action objects and action object groups are thus modal expressions 
in the sense of: ‘It is possible that F can unfold the effect [a, b, c, ... n].’ 
2.2 The action operator  
As mentioned above, we also need a new operator, which denotes the actualization, i.e. the actual oc-
currence of an otherwise only latent effect. Since such an impact operator has two digits, we refer to 
the action object or the action object group on the left as the source object, and the action object or ac-
tion object group on the right as the target object. The action operator thus changes the latent structure 
of action between the involved objects. I use the character, ‘&‘ (English: ‘CAUSES’) for it. The action op-
erator in its standard form will be placed between two objects with their assigned latent potentials.24 
A negation of the action operator is usually dispensable, because the non-occurrence of a process 
usually needs no mention. For the sake of clarity, however, it may be useful in certain cases to explicitly 
indicate the non-occurrence of a process. For this purpose, we use the character Z. Categorically, it 
means ‘does not cause’ and is therefore a shorthand notation for ‘¬ & ‘. The inhibition of the effect, for-
mally: the negative action operator, has no hidden modal semantics. The simple negation of the actual 
effect is modally indifferent. 
Finally, a variant of the action operator is missing, which allows to reproduce object-internal pro-
cesses, as expressed in sentences such as: 'I run', 'It rains', etc. Formally, such processes are single-digit. 
Nevertheless, the formal type is an action operation. We introduce a positive and negative variant of the 
standard action operator whose symbol is simply the inverse of the parent form: % for the positive sin-
gle-digit and Y for the negative single-digit action operator. 
                                                          
23 For the introduction of the action operator, see the following section 2.2. 
24 It is true that there can be any number of action objects on both the right and the left side of an action operator. 
However, these must be linked by the classical ∧, ∨ or ¬  connectives, otherwise the corresponding expression is 
not well-formed. The classical implication is also not allowed here because it is not a simple connector, but already 
a fully truth-value qualified sentencial connector. However, since the OPL does not work with truth values, the im-
plication is basically not applicable. 
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So much to the introduction of the elementary action operator, the formal reflexive action and its 
negation. 
For the characters ‘&‘ and ‘% ‘ as well as for their negative correspondences, ‘Z‘ and ‘Y‘, applies: 
DEF 2: The action operator 
1. The positive double-digit & operator25 as well as its correlative single-digit % operator and 
their negations Z and Y are temporally indifferent, i.e. they do not refer to a particular 
moment of effect in time, nor to their duration. They share this metalinguistic property 
with the terms of propositional logic and the predicate variables of predicate logic.  
2. The places of an action operator to be filled can be composed of a plurality of source or 
target objects. In this case, these form a common efficient cause and are to be connected 
by the ∧, ∨ or ¬ connectives.26 
3. The effect operator, of whatever kind, does not say whether the acting object has ex-
hausted its potency, nor which subsequent processes it sets in motion in the target object 
area. 
4. The action operator is modally qualified.27 By its use, it only says that the designated effect 
occurs. Without its use, only a latent effect is given. 
5. Metalinguistically, the action operator is structured in a binary way: either an effect oc-
curs, or it does not occur. Again, tertium non datur. However, this does not relate to any 
object-language truth value of the expression concerned. 
6. The action operator updates logical possibilities: Updating a latent effect creates a new la-
tent effect. The process denoted by the action operator is therefore that of a change in the 
scope of possible action. This does not require any denotation of states. 
The two places to the left and right of the operator, as we have said, are called the 'source object' 
and the 'target object' of an effect. This also applies to action object groups. Both sides of the operator 
are formally represented in the same way.  
Now it is another and very fundamental feature of process thinking, in contrast to the state-fixed un-
derstanding of the world, that individual processes per se are always snippets from a virtually infinite 
process universe. This requires us formally to use source and target objects in the GPL only with proce-
dural connector characters, to indicate that our expressions are always just snippets of a procedural ho-
lon, i.e. a vast process whole. For example, if a final statement from the GPL is (reading direction always 
from left to right): 
… 
F[a] & G[b], 
in principle, the chain of effects described here is not complete. This should be illustrated by three lead-
ing and subsequent points, i.e. 
                                                          
25 If, in the following, the term 'action operator' is used without any further specification, this always means both 
its positive and negative form. 
With regard to the Aristotelian theory of causes, which is known to name the four causes: 1. efficient cause (causa 
efficiens), 2. material cause (causa materialis), 3. formal cause (causa formalis) und 4. final cause (causa finalis), 
initially, only the efficient cause is formally treated. But below, I will also go into the formal treatment of the final 
cause. 
27 It is however not qualified in terms of modal logic. The difference lies in what it means that something is not 
possible. In modal logic, possibility lies in the middle between the extremes of necessity and impossibility; on top 
of that, in modal logic the necessary (in this case quite contrary to the common sense) is also qualified as possible. 
Within the OPL, on the other hand, possibility is the mode that opposes the other mode of the real. The real is no 
longer possible here because it has already been realized. There is a common generic concept of possibility and 
reality: This is the given. The classification of reality and possibility as species of the genre of the given opens up in 
the first place the formal connection of a transition of possibility to reality. 
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… F[a] & G[b] … . 
Single-digit effects are expressed as follows: 
… F[a] % … , i.e. the right side of the operator remains empty. 
The inclusion of another (here: previously created28) object in an already existing action object group is 
indicated by:  
… F[a] & F[a, b] … . 
However, for the sake of avoiding unnecessary symbols, the leading or following three points may be 
omitted. However, this does not mean anywhere in the GPL that an object remains in a determined 
state after a completed effect. A standalone expression of the form F[a] only indicates a latent and, to-
gether with an action operator, a current process. 
Now it will usually make sense to indicate upon which object(s) an effect subsequently may operate. 
For example, we use the expression F[a] & G[b], meaning: Bank a finances company b, which builds a 
gas turbine G with the money. It will often be necessary in such semantic contexts to indicate to whom 
this effect G, i.e. the construction of the gas turbine, refers. In our example, e.g. one would ask for 
whom b is the gas turbine being built. If we wanted to express this by means of another action operator, 
which points to the following affected object, then we would come into an infinite chain of follow-up 
references, because each affected target instantly triggers new effects. 
To avoid such chain reactions - which does not preclude reference to them in a later step - we simply 
put behind the target object, if necessary, just a reference pointing to its secondary target object, i.e.: 
… F[a] & G[b]c …  
If a is itself the secondary target, the expression is just as simple: 
… F[a] & G[b]a …, 
and in the case of an affected action object group: 
… F[a, b, c] & G[d]a … 
The above expression is a very compact notation for a colloquially rather complex event. The labeling of 
the secondary target object used here is not mandatory. However, putting them into action triggers the 
formal necessity to have the secondary target object once again act as a source object in the subsequent 
expression sequence. Consequently, an expression having such a secondary effect identifier cannot be in 
the last position of an expression sequence. Something must happen to the respective secondary target 
object. However, this need for subsequent mention is omitted if the secondary target object is behind a 
negative impact operator. A practical example of this follows below in Section 5. 
For the sake of transparency, we only use the labeling of secondary target objects in the following, if 
this is advisable in a specific context. 
3. Admissibility of the classic  ∧- and ∨-Connectives and the classic negation (¬) 
We can now construct more complex expressions from the already explicated form set. This concerns 
first the possibility of a multiplicity of both causes and effects. The following expressions are valid in the 
GPL. However, the classical operators '∧' and '∨' retain only part of their classical meaning here: 
… F[a] & G[c] ∨ H[d] … , 
                                                          
28 For the introduction of the availability operators, see section 4 below. 
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… F[a] ∨ F[b] & G[c] ∧ H[d] … . 
or also 
… F[a] & G[b] ∧ H[b] & I[c] … . 
The connectives '∧' and '∨' are here, quite traditionally, always double digits. However, with the fol-
lowing proviso: they are (logically speaking) not sentential connectives with a truth value that can be 
represented in a truth table. This confirms the already mentioned fundamental paradigm of GPL: The 
formal validity of their expressions does not imply their suitability for their evaluation as true or false or 
an even more extensive range of values. The GPL knows only a metalinguistic admissibility or inadmissi-
bility of their expressions, i.e. only the difference between well-formed and non-well-formed expres-
sions. This is in line with the reality that should be formalized with GPL: Events either happen or not; 
Statements that refer to the pure event without containing a metalinguistic assessment of the state-
ment can therefore give no metalinguistic information whether the respective statement is true or false. 
This in turn means that expressions of the GPL cannot be represented in the form of truth tables. In a 
sense, it is formally purer than many of the classical logics, which basically operate on two different lev-
els, the object-language statement level and the metalinguistic level of evaluation.29  
First, we turn to the question of the applicability of the, ∧ 'and, ∨' connectives.30 Now, can the '∨' 
connective (i.e. the disjunction) also be on the right side of the action operator? This question again pre-
sents us with a decision that can only be made in terms of the application of the formalism to reality. If 
we take formal-logical expressions directly as ontological, albeit highly generalized, images of empirical 
reality, the possibility of the implied real disjunction seems quite unclear. Only in the field of quantum 
mechanics and below would a physicist normally speak of real indecision. Philosophically, on the other 
hand, the situation is by no means clear even for the higher levels of existence. If anything, it is rather 
controversial.31 Fortunately, we do not have to decide this question either here. For the GPL, I claim only 
                                                          
29 And even this labeling of the evaluation of classical logical statements is not yet complete. In the evaluation e.g. 
of statements of classical propositional logic, it is not clear whether their assessment as true or false also refers to 
or not refers to the empirical basic statement in the case of their application. For example, consider the two state-
ments 'The apple is ripe' (= p) and 'I like to eat apples' (= q). These statements can be logically modeled very simply 
as, p ∧ q '. If both subexpressions are logically true, then according to the classical two-valued propositional logic 
the total expression is at least formally true. But how can we justify such a purely formal truth on a more general 
level? Logically, we judge the premises p and q in an abstract, i.e. hypothetical-empirical sense as true or false. But 
if this empirical connection of the premises is also to apply to the conclusion, then it is no longer a purely formal 
truth. From this impurity, however, then, mutatis mutandis, the entire formal concept of truth would ultimately be 
infested. 
I do not want to talk about pragmatism parroting John Dewey (see Dewey [2002]). The problem of the connec-
tion between sign and signified is ultimately metaphysical and cannot be dealt with here. The said semantic ambiv-
alence of the so-called truth values has therefore ensured continued discussions since its beginnings. It led Tarski 
to declare that the phrase 'snow is white' is true exactly when snow is white (Tarski [1944], section 1.4). It is alarm-
ing when, in a discipline like logic, even such a modest insight requires special expertise. However, the relationship 
between formal and empirical logic need not be discussed further here, as the GPL does not operate on truth val-
ues. 
30 In the textbook literature on logic, the terms 'connective' and 'sentential connector' are usually only very 
vaguely distinguished, although both are quite different. A connective does not necessarily have truth-relevant 
properties, whereas a sentential connector always has. Connectives are functionally much more primitive than 
sentential connectors. Thus, if one uses the signs '∧' or '∨' as the connective, they only say that two terms in the 
respective context have a functional connection. On the other hand, if they are used as sentential connectors in 
the context of propositional logic, they are semantically defined by the known truth tables. Since the GPL does not 
operate with truth values, these signs must be understood therefore strictly as a connective. 
31 In Sohst [2016], p. 80ff. I have dealt in detail with the question whether, in view of our current scientific 
knowledge of the world, it is even possible to say whether the course of the world is strictly determinate. I think 
there to have shown that this cannot be deduced from our previous knowledge, and that such determination is 
even impossible for empirical reasons that seem virtually incontestable. 
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that it should be useful as an epistemological or communicative tool. Those who agree with this opinion, 
because they take it for granted or even trivial, but it should be remembered that the underlying ques-
tion of the empirical validity of logical statements is not yet answered. From the said conception of logic 
in general, and thus also the GPL as a pure cognitive or orientation tool, it follows, however, that we can 
allow the disjunction of a process without further reservations also on the impact side. This greatly en-
hances the operational freedom of the GPL. 
The admissibility of the classically two-valued negation (¬) has already been mentioned above in 
connection with the negative operative operator.  
4. The positive and negative availability operator 
However, this raises the much more general question of how to connect to an atomic process statement 
of the kind shown above. Therefore, before we can deal with branching due to a process-logical disjunc-
tion, we must look at another fundamental and quite new aspect of the GPL. As stated, the GPL does not 
describe object states, but active objects, i.e. objects as units of effect. This results in the requirement to 
formally model the formation and the disappearance of active objects. Thus, we establish that well-
formed expressions may contain only those active objects that have been formally generated before and 
have not yet been eliminated.32 We define the character 'f' (“UP”) for the introduction of a new active 
object and the character 'd' (“DOWN”) for its elimination. For these signs holds: 
DEF 3: Availability operations 
1. By the f-operation, a real object is generated in its entirety, i.e. as an object together with 
its specific effect. In its further use, this object may also adopt any other effects which need 
not be indicated by an f-operation to be valid. On the other hand, a simple introduction of a 
new action for a previously created object requires no explicit mention. 
2. The d-operation removes the entire affected active object, i.e. it is thus no longer available 
for any further operation. Therefore, the d operator is applied only to the object kernel, that 
is, for example, d p instead of d A[p].  
3. Before an f and after a d-operation, there is no need for a '... ' mark, i.e. no inclusion mark, 
if they are the first, last, or sole operation within an expression on their side of the expres-
sion. 
4. f- and d-operations can only be used within a complete action operation, i.e. in an opera-
tion containing the action operator &. 
5. Before the introduction of an object by f and after the removal of an object by means of d, 
an expression containing such an object not yet introduced or already eliminated is invalid. 
6. The d operation immediately stops the entire effectiveness of an object. That is, such an op-
eration cannot trigger any further effects, but will be only the effect of preceding events. The 
d operation can therefore only take place on the right side of an action expression. 
7. The f operation may appear on both sides of an effect expression. However, it must always 
refer to a specific effect of the object created, i.e. it cannot create the object kernel alone. 
8. Both the f and the d operation can be elementary parts of a complex statement. 
From this follows another important distinction to all state logics: The object-language 'horizon' of an 
expression sequence, as that which an expression sequence deals with, is not fixed from the beginning, 
                                                          
32 This procedure will remind logicians who are familiar with modern programming languages of the need to in-
stantiate program objects and of their possible release. However, as already explained at the beginning, this is not 
about computer worlds but about our immediate cognitive reality. Now, for most of the objects that surround us, 
we do not have to worry about their explicit generation. However, in a formal system like the GPL, it is sensible to 
indicate, for reasons of transparency, which objects are procedurally already or still available. In the real world, 
this is more akin to the practical availability of objects, not their fundamental existence. 
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but can change considerably in the course of the expression sequence. The GPL is thus also formally dy-
namic. It not only describes processes but is also consistent in considering changes in the object inven-
tory in the specific application. 
This brings us back to the question of what a connection to complex expressions, such as disjunc-
tions, might look like. Basically, any object on the right side of an operation that has not been eliminated 
because of the effect can be used to represent consequential effects, however not necessarily. For ex-
ample, let's look at this expression sequence: 
1. … fV[a] & f L[c]a ∧ fE[b]a 
2. E[b] & da ∨ K[a] … 
This sequence says in colloquial language:  
1. An object a appears whose effect V is to produce the active objects L[c] and E[b]. 
2. Of these two new action objects, object b either causes a to no longer have the effect 
V or a to have the new effect K. 
To illustrate the example in an everyday situation, one could imagine it (somewhat decorated): „ […] 
One morning, Albert appears in a student flat-sharing community and somehow manages to make sure 
that the cohabitee Claudia has a crush on him, while her roommate Bernd becomes seriously jealous. In 
his resentment Bernd either ushers Albert out of the apartment, or he manages to persuade the com-
petitor to bake a delicious cake for all residents. […]“33 For this somewhat more complicated sequence 
of events, the above formal presentation is quite compact. Furthermore, I would not know how to for-
mulate them state-logically while fully preserving the dynamic core statement. 
Now, however, it will be necessary to clarify which binding effect a once introduced action operation 
has and how an object kernel can be attributed new effects. To be specific: Does Claudia must have a 
crush on Albert from now on forever? Hardly likely; reality also requires formal adaptability here. Basi-
cally, action-like relationships are shown in binary form in the GPL. They are either 'on' or 'off'. We thus 
assume that a once established relationship does not change automatically. For example, Albert himself 
is unable to eliminate Claudia's affects to him, unless his own latent action profile changes accordingly. 
Once an effect relationship has occurred, it can only be canceled in the GPL by another, further action 
operation. This operation is exactly that form of negation that we have already encountered above with 
the action sign 'Z'. This negation is now used. We continue our above expression in the sense of a fic-
tional event, according to which another person named Franz appears and Claudia makes it clear that 
there is no point in being in love with Albert. To formalize this process, we repeat the initial expression 
sequence and add another line that does not yet have to produce the decision regarding the preceding 
disjunction: 
1. … fV[a] & fL[c]a ∧ fE[b]a 
2. E[b] & da ∨ K[a] 
3. fU[f] Z L[c]a … 
The original relationship f V[a] & f L[c] is thus no longer available. The secondary target at the end of 
line 3 follows a negative action operator. Further reference to the core object a is therefore no longer 
necessary (see above explanation at the end of section 2). 
But now let us also bring about the pending decision of the disjunction… d a ∨ K[a]. We therefore 
write (including the preceding lines): 
                                                          
33 This example contains relational specifications that the previous formal expression does not yet depict, e.g. that 
said Claudia only loves Michael and no-one else. Diese fehlenden relationalen Merkmale werden wir erst weiter 
unten einführen. We will introduce these missing relational features below 
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1. …  V[a] & fL[c]a ∧ fE[b]a 
2. E[b] & da ∨ K[a] 
3. fU[f] Z L[c]a 
4. E[b] & K[a] … 
Now, logic is generally understood to be the art of reasoning. Where is the logical inference here? In 
fact, several conclusions are possible from what has happened, for example: 
 …  
Ñ E[b] Z da 
or           … 
Ñ V[a] Z L[c] 
Both conclusions are formally valid following the previous determinations. They also correspond to the 
expected result from our fictional example: After convincing his opponent to bake a cake, Bernd is no 
longer able to throw him out, and Albert in turn cannot induce Claudia any longer to love him. In princi-
ple, however, it should be noted here that conclusions in all process logic, not just the GPL, only play a 
provisional role. The habitat of the real logical conclusion is the ancient syllogism. Already in classical-
modern logics, recast is more important than the end. Finally, in the known process logics as well as in 
the GPL, the conclusion is nothing more than the somewhat random end of a sequence of expressions 
that could be continued if necessary. 
5. Process-logical action relations 
We have already mentioned that realized effects often need to be supplemented with a relational fea-
ture to better reflect the intended reality. Particularly in hierarchical social relationships, the roles of the 
parties involved everywhere also define their interaction, e.g. between doctor and patient, teacher and 
student, civil servant (representative of the state?) and citizen, employer and employee etc. Such asym-
metries of the relationship of actions and effects, which are frequently encountered not only in the so-
cial, but also in the purely physically or chemically defined conditions, must necessarily be reproducible 
within the framework of a formal process logic. This shows a strong practical difference to the state-
based process logic of the type mentioned at the beginning.  
Such additional features of action relationships must, to be realistically applicable, always focus on 
the overall action relationship, not just on the involved object capabilities. For example, an employer 
may give instructions to the employee, but not vice versa. However, this does not apply to the basic 
right to terminate the employment relationship; this right is mutual. In such cases, the same object 
cores stand parallel to each other in different interaction with one another. Consequently, the said qual-
ification of the action relationship must always refer to its concrete totality of all effects involved.  
However, such a concrete distinction should now be preceded by a general categorization, which re-
lations are permissible at all, that is, a form catalog of the permissible relations of action between ob-
jects. This can be taken from the classical relation logic. We define: 
DEF 4: Permitted action relationships 
Effects of actions can be formally valid in the following way: 
1. Reflexivity: This concerns the action species: 
                                F[a] & G[a] 
                                F[a] Z G[a]   
Note that the reflexivity (self-efficacy) here refers to the object nucleus, while the concrete 
effect must differ. If an expression differs neither in its core expression nor in its concrete 
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effect, there would be no effect whatsoever. Such reflective relationships are not self-evi-
dent. If they are to be admitted, they must be explicitly awarded for this; see below. If the 
reflexive relationship is allowed, then 
                                F[a] & G[a] equally G[a] & F[a], and for 
                                F[a] Z G[a] equally G[a] Z F[a]. 
The action relationship F[a] & d a can never be reversed, because a removed object cannot 
exert any further effect, see above Def. 3.6. 
 
2. Transitivity:          F[a] & G[b]   
                                 G[b] & H[c]   
                                 Ñ F[a] & H[c] 
 
Transitivity is available for both the positive and negative standard action operator. It is pre-
sented above as a conclusion to illustrate the formal potential of the action operator. It's 
basically just an abbreviated illustration for a chain inference between F[a] and H[c]. Empiri-
cally, chains of effects are never overall transitive, because they always require the causal 
intermediate step to achieve the result. However, the transitive relation of action has a high 
practical relevance insofar as we often sum up many sub-events in our images of real 
events. For example, we say: 'The dog was injured by that driver', although the driver did 
not do it himself, but the car he steered. With such sentences we express a responsibility 
rather than a causal relationship, whereby causality still plays an important role. Often, we 
shorten causal relationships simply because the respective description level suggests this. 
For example, if I say, "Because of the cold, I have a stuffy nose," this sentence expresses a 
much more complex interdependence. Nevertheless, the possibility of such sentences is not 
only sensible but even indispensable for everyday orientation.34 But because the possibility 
of analyzing and synthesizing such detail and global action chains is constantly needed, we 
must also provide the formal-logical possibility for their representation in an action logic. 
 
3.  Commutativity:     F[a] & G[b] 
                                  Ñ G[b] & F[a] 
 
Here, too, the non-compulsory formal alternative of action reversal is illustrated as a conclu-
sion in propositional logic, this type of reversibility is also referred to as symmetry based on 
physical terminology, which is particularly useful in process logic.35 Again, the commutative 
or symmetrical effect by no means self-evident. A reversal of effects is empirically not the 
rule. A subspecies of the symmetric relationship is its negative reversibility: 
 
                                   F[a] & G[b] 
                                  Ñ G[b] Z F[a] 
 
This again clearly shows the difference between the propositional negation and the negative 
effect operator. It is something completely different to explicitly allow the negative reversal 
of effects, as stated above, or simply not to say anything about the commutativity of a 
                                                          
34 A closer look reveals further questions: Under what circumstances is it right to speak of a set of parts as the ac-
tual cause of an effect? In a car accident, it should not be difficult to consider the car in question as an action unit. 
But what about complex natural events, e.g. rain, landslides or tidal waves? Are mass social phenomena such as 
collective consumer behavior, political elections or even riots and war events sensibly to treat as causally unified 
events? Fortunately, we do not have to go back to this question here. In Sohst [2016], p. 143 ff., I discuss this fun-
damental ontological question in detail. 
35 See, for example, Kutschera / Breitkopf [1971], p. 130. 
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concrete relationship of action. In this case, from the non-distinction of commutativity 
merely follows the simple negation of the inversion, i.e. ¬(G[b] & F[a]) or, which means the 
same thing, G[b] ¬ & F[a], which does not apply categorically, but only for the respective 
expression, so long as no further expression removes this restriction.  
 
It is clear, therefore, that the presence of the simple or negative symmetry of action must in 
any case be explicitly indicated formally, if only to distinguish it from the positive symmetry, 
since these two action alternatives are mutually exclusive.  
 
4. Distributivity:  
 
The following applies: 
 
           F[a] & (G[b] ∨ H[c]) ∧ [I[b] ∨ K[c]) 
                                  Ñ F[a] & ([G[b] ∧ (I[b] ∨ K[c])) ∨ (H[c] ∧ (I[b] ∨ K[c])) 
 
This in turn yields the validity of all the following conclusions: 
 
                                  Ñ F[a] & G[b] ∧ (I[b] ∨ K[c]) (Continuation with the 1st main alternative) 
                                  Ñ F[a] & H[c] ∧ (I[b] ∨ K[c]) (Continuation with the 2nd main alternative) 
                                  Ñ F[a] & H[c] ∧ I(b] (Continuation with the 1st subalternative)  
                                  Ñ F[a] & H[c] ∧ K[c] (Continuation with the 2nd subalternative)  
 
Distributivity, like commutativity or symmetry of action, requires explicit formal labeling. 
 
5. Labeling Rules:  
a) The relational characterization of interaction takes place at the impact operator. It applies 
to the entire qualified expression consisting of source and target objects. 
b) Once a characterization (i.e. the label for an expression) has been introduced, it is only 
binding for the source and target objects involved in the selected relationship. Other mutual 
effects of the same object cores are not affected. 
c) If several objects connected to each other by the ∧-connective are involved on the source 
or destination side, then the relational characterization of the action relationship always ap-
plies to the entirety of the objects connected in this way. This means that the same effect 
cannot take place between individual elements of the participating object group inde-
pendently of their relational identification. 
d) If several objects connected to each other by the ∨ connective are involved on the source 
or target side, then the relational characterization of the action relationship applies only to 
the individual members of the disjunction in relation to the source or target object, which is 
the same for all disjunctive alternatives. 
e) Relational identifications of action relationships can subsequently be reversed.  
f) Relational identifications of interaction may basically, i.e. under appropriate circum-
stances, be used cumulatively. 
The explicit identification of an action operator as reflexive, commutative, transitive or distributive is 
required so that appropriate valid conclusions can be drawn from the relevant expressions. Without 
such labeling, all inferences that require it are invalid. 
We characterize an action relationship as reflexive, transitive, commutative or distributive by means 
of a subscript behind the affected effect operator, i.e. 
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&R+ for the positive and &R- for the negative reflexivity 
&K  for the commutativity 
&D  for the distributivity  
&-T  for the negation of transitivity 
&- (<label>)  for the cancellation of any relational labeling. 
The concrete use of these additional labelings can be illustrated for example in this way: 
F[a] & R-, K G[b] ǀ the action relationship is negatively reflexive and commutative 
G[a] & R-, K H[c] ǀ and the subsequent action relationship as well.  
H[c] & da 
6. Object merging and splitting 
6.1 Fundamentals 
At the beginning, I pointed out that the GPL presented here has a possibility that is inherently not acces-
sible to the state logical systems, because they cannot reflect changes in the respective object existence 
beyond the limits of the properties of these objects. However, our everyday life is full of examples of ob-
ject fusion and splitting. Thus, in all production processes, where a larger totality is produced from indi-
vidual parts, new objects are created that did not exist before. Conversely, each detachment of a piece 
from a preceding object unity is always a splitting, when, after having removed it, the number of inde-
pendent, i.e. individual objects turns out to be bigger than before. The naturalness and frequency of 
these events in everyday life is so ubiquitous that it is astonishing that so far no logical formalism has 
been invented which enables their reproduction.  
An expression of the fusion creates a new, unified target object from a multiplicity of source objects. 
We use the sign ‘5‘ for it. The reverse process, the splitting has a source object to the object and pro-
duces from it a multiplicity of independent targets. We use the sign ‚∅‘. Both processes are formally re-
alized by corresponding operators, which, because they are closely related to each other, are referred to 
below with the English initials of their identifiers as ‘FS operators‘. 
DEF 5: The FS operators 
We define the FS operators as follows: 
1. 1. For the fusion, at least two different source objects must be named on the left side of the 
5-operator, separated by commas for better distinction. 
2. On the right side of the 5-operator exactly one new target object appears, i.e. an object that 
has not yet been formally created. Its production, in the course of a fusion therefore re-
quires no prior positive availability operation. 
3. 3. In subsequent expressions of a fusion, the fused source objects remain effectively availa-
ble to each other only internally. They cannot exert an external effect as long as they have 
not been removed from the fusion by subsequent separation. We call this logical feature 
'endogenous constraint'.  
4. The source object of split objects (operator: ∅) only perishes and is therefore no longer 
available when it completely disassembles into its individual parts. Only in this case, a corre-
sponding object must be newly created to become available again. The demise of an object 
due to total splitting must be displayed separately. If this is not done, it will still be available 
in the further course of events. 
Let's look at an example expression sequence using the FS operators. We imagine that Albert, here: 
a, as an avid cyclist buys three new items of a racing bike and combines them into a new racing bike: 
1. … f P[a] & fb ∧ fc ∧ fd 
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2. A[a] & F[b 5 c 5 d] & ff 
The unifying fusion of the parts b, c, and d into the new object f is done formally simply by bracketing 
the parts to be united and an action operator pointing to the creation of the new object f. If the target 
object of the fusion already exists, because (in our example) Albert buys new parts, but builds these into 
an already existing bicycle, we express this as follows: 
1. … f f 
2. f P[a] & fb ∧ fc ∧ fd 
3. A[a] & F[b 5 c 5 d]f … 
In this case, the bicycle f is first generated at the beginning of the process sequence to then be used 
as a target object. This gives us the consistency of our respective object-effect universe. 
Similarly, the dissolution of an object into its constituent parts and the detachment of individual 
parts from a persisting object will be represented, whereby the named parts are generated here simul-
taneously: 
1. … f a 
2. D[a] & f b ∅ f c ∅ f … 
6.2  Σ-Objects 
However, the formalization of an object fusion opens further possibilities of representation if we distin-
guish between two fundamentally different forms of such a fusion, namely: 
a) Demise of the elementary objects by fusing into a new simple object 
b) Continuation of elementary objects after having been integrated into a new, complex ob-
ject. 
If we make an object fuse in the sense of (b) above, the result is a new, complex object, i.e. while 
preserving the demise of its elements from fusion, this new object can be used in the following as an in-
dependent entity like any other simple object. In addition, we can now use this new object to manage 
not only "external" effects from and to other objects other than itself, but also to deal with its own com-
ponents, i.e. for internal control. The basic idea of such constructs is that such a fusion creates a super-
ordinate unit of action that organizes its elements in such a way that the leading unit of action, in inter-
action with changed environmental conditions, is adaptable in terms of its internal structure. From now 
on I call such complex objects Σ objects. However, the term 'Σ-object' is a class term. When creating a 
concrete object of this type, the type designation Σ is therefore to be added to the actual object desig-
nation as a superscript, to maintain the distinction of its elementary objects, e.g. in the form F[pΣ]. 
Suppose we create such a Σ-object named p, which results from the integration of the persisting ele-
mentary objects a, b and c. The elementary objects experience, as a result of the fusion into a Σ-object, a 
change of their potentials for action precisely to the extent necessary for the creation and maintenance 
of this new object. In addition, their action profiles remain unaffected. To create such a Σ-object, it is 
therefore necessary to specify the changes in the action profiles of its constitutive elementary objects 
that occur through the fusion. The GPL does not have an operator that indicates the change in potency. 
However, there is the formal possibility of a positive, i.e. new assignment of action powers by means of 
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a according assignment expression to an existing object, as well as the reverse formal possibility of a 
negative assignment, i.e. a deletion, of potential effects by means of a potential negation (symbol: ¬).36  
With the help of these two formal operations, it is possible to specify for each elementary object ex-
actly what changes it undergoes through its integration into a Σ-object. But such representations of 
change are not compulsory. Taken purely formally, every elementary object of an Σ-object is curtailed in 
its horizon of action by the fact that as an element of the Σ-object it can no longer develop its own exter-
nal effect. However, this is already a consequence of the fusion anyway and therefore does not need to 
be displayed separately. Expressions for the creation of Σ-objects must, however, at the moment of their 
formation by fusion, explicitly indicate all affected elementary objects and the modification operations 
taking place on them. Otherwise, such an expression is incomplete and therefore no longer well-formed. 
As a form of the notation of the processes involved, we determine: 
1.  To introduce the new Σ-object following the convention already mentioned above, wherein 
the initial object example V [a] is freely chosen:  
V[a] & F[a 5 b 5 c] & fpΣ… 
2. However, the above expression does not say anything about the mentioned changes to the po-
tential effects of the affected elementary objects. Since these take place logically simultane-
ously with the generation of the Σ-object, but their mention in the same line can become very 
confusing, we write three continuation points at the end of the line generating the Σ-object 
and complete the said changes of the elementary objects in the following line, although there 
is no need for any further action operator, but rather a formal indication of the changed action 
profiles of the integrated elementary objects. As usual, we write these changes in square 
brackets after the Σ sign, otherwise multiple changes to the same elementary object in simple 
parentheses; as a delimiter we use the semicolon at all levels, for example: 
pΣ [(¬K[a]; L[a]; M[a]); (L[a]; N[a]); (¬O[c])]. 
This will reveal the nested structure of the new Σ object. If the affected elementary objects still 
have other potential effects before their integration, which are not mentioned here, these re-
main untouched. 
3. Furthermore, in the further course of the expression sequence, it will often also be necessary 
to add further internal elementary objects to the newly-created Σ-object or to delete existing 
elementary objects. This, too, can be formally expressed without further ado: 
A[pΣ] & [… f(L[d]; M[d]; N[d])], i.e. 
A[pΣ] & [… d(a; b)]. 
In addition, a Σ-object can formally act without restrictions and completely independently like an ele-
mentary object. In particular, it can also have potential effects, e.g. be assigned or denied to it in the 
form F[pΣ].  
7. Control structures 
The previous section already mentioned the possibility of a process-logical presentation of internal con-
trol structures. Such controls (the term will be discussed in more detail below) may refer both to the 
possibility of altering the internal states of a Σ-object as set forth above, as well as to the 
                                                          
36 See above section 2.1 
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interdependencies of updating an effect between free, i.e. objects not bound in Σ objects, including the 
interaction between simple and complex objects.  
In all contemporary programming languages, control structures are an essential element of each lan-
guage. However, the GPL is not a programming language, but a logical formalism.37 It offers control 
structures, but only to the minimum extent necessary for the formal representation of process depend-
encies. Process logic cannot do without this, because formally an essential feature of process structures 
is the dependence of the updating of an initially only latent effect of certain environmental conditions. 
First, it must be clarified what a process condition is. In fact, in the context of GPL, it simply means 
defining a limiting condition when a latent object power is updated. Thus, process conditions never 
force the actualization of a potency, but always only restrict the arbitrariness of the occurrence of an 
effect. On the other hand, when the condition occurs, they enforce the specified follow-up effect. In this 
regard, the process conditions formalized below are deterministic. Such conditions may be coupled in 
the GPL to a single consequence effect or a co-occurring multiplicity of such consequences. This also 
shows an essential difference to all control structures of the usual programming languages: Since these 
are all based on the well-known state logics, and indeed predominantly on a two-valued propositional 
and predicate logic, all control structures also work only through the control of states of other objects in 
the respective program horizon. That means: They do not control processes but only states. By contrast, 
the basically very simple control structure reacts directly to other processes, not just to their resulting 
state sequences. This, in turn, has implications for the validity of such structures, as will be seen below. 
In the GPL we use only a single control operator to indicate the dependence of an action condition on 
the occurrence of other effects whose sign is the word 'IF' known from the programming languages. The 
syntax for his use is, for example: 
IF {<action potency 1, 2, …n>) & (<action potency 3, 4, …n >)}  
or in the case of the negative condition, i.e. not the positive triggering of a subsequent action, but the 
prevention of a consequential action 
IF {(< action potency 1, 2, …n>) Z (<action potency 3, 4, …n >)}  
the affected potencies on both sides of the dependent effect may or may not be the same. The above 
notation implies, within the inner brackets, a logical AND operation between the individual action pow-
ers on both sides of the effect operator. An OR operation is also possible without further ado, but must 
then be explicitly indicated by using the ∨ symbol. 
The definition of such a control structure is therefore basically only a deterministic generalization of 
the otherwise arbitrarily occurring effects. 'IF' has the effect that a certain consequential effect always 
occurs when the specified conditions of effect occur. Thus, the IF operator not only enables control of 
causal relationships, but also their automation. We can now give a specific IF expression as well as entire 
complexes of nested IF operators each an individual name. Then we need only mention the name of this 
IF operator in an expression sequence at the point where the trigger already set in the IF expression oc-
curs. Then we can jump right to the end of the previously defined sequence of effects. 
For example, consider the following IF expressions as given, where we combine two elementary op-
erators into one complex IF expression and give each of these operators a unique name following the 
expression: 
                                                          
37 Control structures were adopted by computer science early on from cybernetics. However, informatics in the 
form developed today is still based on state-logical paradigms, where process dependencies can only be repre-
sented after a corresponding transformation into a series of object states into control structures. In contrast, the 
GPL provides these means from the outset, i.e. as an instant property of process-logical formalism itself. 
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IF {F[a] ∨ G[b] & F[b], H[b]} IF_1 
IF {F[c] Z L[b]} IF_2 
IF {IF_1, IF_2& M[c]} IF_3 
… 
G[b] ∧ F[c] IF_2 Z L[b], & IF_3 M[c]. 
This is a simple example of nesting. Even a simple chaining is possible: 
IF {F[a] ∨ G[b] & F[b], H[b]} IF_4 
IF {F[b] Z L[b]} IF_5 
… 
G[b] IF_4, IF_5 Z L[b]. 
By constructing even more complex conditional structures, it is possible to present very extensive 
effects with a low expression length.  
Just as simple is the abrogation of once defined conditions. It takes place by simple negation of the 
relevant IF expression, designated by its unique name, for example: 
¬ IF_5. 
The possibility of negating an effect condition clearly shows the difference to the control structures 
of common programming languages. Since we are dealing with a conditional operator in the IF operator 
of the OPL that is 'incessant', i.e. not only in the case of a concrete inquiry of the status, but perma-
nently in its entire horizon of effectiveness, we must also cancel it again if the condition no longer ap-
plies. In contrast, in the case of programming languages, control structures always occur at very specific 
program points at which certain states in the program horizon of known objects are queried. Program-
matic control structures therefore have only a very local and punctual, i.e. unique effect. 
On the other hand, the horizon of validity of a GPL control structure can certainly be restricted when 
applied to a Σ object.38 If an IF operator is applied to the elementary objects of a Σ-object, it can by defi-
nition have no effect outside this object because the internal latent effects of a Σ-object cannot be di-
rectly updated from the outside. Σ objects must always be addressed from the outside as independent 
integral entities. However, indirectly, an external influence on the internal potencies of the Σ-object can 
be represented by the respective Σ-object itself appearing on the left side, i.e. the conditional side of an 
IF operator, whereby complementarily on the right side an Σ-internal order of action is determined. In 
this way, even a coupling of so-called sibling objects can be represented. For example, suppose that we 
want to represent the history of the action of an object that is an integral part of an Σ-object, but also, 
ontologically speaking, has an existence outside of that object. This is possible in the GPL as well.39 Such 
relationships are mapped in the OPL as two different objects, because the respective action profiles dif-
fer. Ontologically, an object identity is present here. However, this does not come into its own in terms 
of formal logic because logic is generally not an instrument for mapping ontological conditions, but ra-
ther a means of plausibility of assertions in linguistic communication.40 For this reason, it is formally bet-
ter to logically represent such different roles of ontologically identical objects as different, but specifi-
cally coupled, objects. I refer to such coupled objects as sibling objects. 
                                                          
38 This has a certain similarity with the so-called encapsulation in the object-oriented programming languages. 
39 Such conditions are the rule, especially in the social sphere. We usually refer to these different functions as the 
different roles of a person. For example, a person may have a role as an employee of a company and remains unaf-
fected by it as a "free" person outside that company. 
40 In this regard, I join the group of representatives of the so-called inferential role semantics, in particular the in-
ferentialism of Robert B. Brandom, see Brandom [1994]. 
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The process-logical coupling of sibling objects can be formally represented by two successive IF oper-
ators, whereby in the middle between the 'free' outer and the bound Σ-internal object, the Σ-object al-
ways acts as an intermediary. For example, let a1 be the 'free' outer object, G[bΣ] a Σ-object named b, 
and a2 an internal element of the Σ-object. Then we note: 
IF {F[a1] & G[bΣ]} IF_6 
IF {G[bΣ] & H[a2]} IF_7  
If IF_6 occurs, IF_7 is also triggered immediately. As a result, an external event of the "free" sibling ob-
ject is coupled to the effect of its Σ-internal sibling object. Of course, such a coupling is not limited to sib-
ling objects. However, the possibility of creating sibling objects in particular allows the logical mapping 
of relationships that often play a decisive role in reality. For example, a person can develop very differ-
ent effects in the different roles of their life context. However, if she physically dies in one of these roles, 
she is no longer available in any other role, too. Therefore, such relationships must also be logically rep-
resentable.41  
Further formal arrangements for the representation of control structures are not envisaged in the 
GPL, because all necessary process-logical connections can already be represented in this way. 
8. Alternative process flows 
The reality in which we have to orientate ourselves, confronts us with another peculiarity that we usu-
ally deal with in everyday life without difficulty, but which has never been mentioned explicitly in West-
ern logic. This concerns the subjective interpretation of events, which we are aware of, but not sure, 
whether our own view corresponds to reality. For example, a known customer suddenly no longer pays 
the delivered goods. Is he up to something against us and wants to use the owed sum as a pledge? Is he 
possibly insolvent and cannot pay? In such situations we provisionally gain security by going through 
various alternative courses of action. Nevertheless, in order to make the unsafe variants again realiza-
ble, i.e. we often come up with a result that can also be achieved through several alternative routes be-
cause of the existing uncertainties.  
The GPL can map such alternative process flows within an overall conclusion. In the course of their 
development, divisions initially arise as a result of the uncertain alternatives of an initially unambiguous 
process unit. These alternative pathways may or may not be merged later: 
                                                          
41 Denis Noble in Noble [2017], p. 69ff., describes very impressive cases of such dependency on the molecular-bio-
logical level. 
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Fig. 2: Splitting and merging of alternative pathways 
We see here several alternative pathways, some of which are not pursued, represented by, ... '. How-
ever, two strands converge at the end, the one over the steps {1, 2.1, 3.1.1, 4.1.1.1, 5} and the other 
over {1, 2.2, 3.2.2, 4.2.2.1, 5}. State logics can hardly represent such alternative splits and possible con-
flations, because states by definition cannot map developments. 
9. Coupling of process-logical and state-logical expressions 
Previously, we mentioned that process and state logic expressions can complement each other. From 
the practical perspective of the application of logical formalisms, this is even a necessity if we want to 
comprehensively model reality. Although the GPL claims to represent the primary access not only of hu-
mans, but also of all higher animals in the world. Nevertheless, state focused propositions are indispen-
sable for every living being. Even a squirrel hiding acorns somewhere in an earth cave, not only has to 
remember the location of the cave, but also the simple fact that acorns are there at all. This is important 
status information. Expressions of the GPL and the traditional state logical systems can be easily mixed 
in this regard.  
The question, however, is how one can even extract cognitive states out of genuine process flows 
and vice versa. Even a brief reflection on this shows in which different worlds process thinking and state 
thinking are involved. Although processes, to be able to be treated as individual (i.e. single) processes at 
all, always lead from a start to an end, these boundaries turn out to generate objects each with deter-
mined state properties.42 However, the formalism of the GPL nowhere yields a determinate state, and 
conversely fixed predicate logical statements never yield a procedural cause-effect relationship. In the 
case of a formal language change, the respective missing element must therefore be introduced ad hoc. 
Accordingly, such an introduction should be expressed by a clear marking of the respective system 
change. 
As an indication for the change of the logical system I propose the following: ‚ ǀGPL ‘ when changing to 
the GPL and ‚ ǀP ‘ when turning back to predicate logic. Specifically, this could look like this: 
1. … f K[a] & fb ǀ An initial GPL statement 
2. L[b] & ǀP F(b) ∈ X ǀ Switching to predicate logic directly after the action operator 
3. ∀(x) : G(x)  ǀ Going on in predicate logic fashion after the change 
                                                          
42 See in detail Sohst [2016], p. 123ff. 
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4. Ñ F(b) ∧ G(x) ǀ Predicate logical conclusion from 3. 
5. F(b) ∧ G(x) ǀGPL &… ǀ Newly switching to GPL. 
Such a change certainly requires scrutiny to always be clear about which level of expression one is 
currently dealing with. The graphical distinction between square and round brackets of the respective 
objects somewhat intuitively eases this task.  
10. Functional completeness and consistency of the GPL 
Since the invention of mathematical logic, beginning in the late nineteenth century, formal-logic systems 
must prove the validity of their conclusions by passing various formal examinations. The two most im-
portant of these suitability tests are known under the terms 'functional completeness' and 'consistency' 
(meaning: without formal contradictions). Logicians, however, despite the rigidity of their validity claims, 
are altogether astonishingly tolerant people when it comes to letting deviants have their say. So there 
are now a great deal of logical approaches that do not meet one or both of the above requirements and 
still have their practical justification.43 The question, therefore, is whether or to what extent the process 
logic presented here offers the possibility of proving its functional completeness and consistency.  
10.1 Functional completeness  
A set of connectives is called functionally complete if, and only if, a small subset or at best only one of 
these connectives suffices to replace all the other connectives of a given formal language. It does not 
matter if the total set of connectors contains single-digit or multi-digit connectives. The functional com-
pleteness is therefore the result of a kind of compression: An arbitrary set of logical connectives can be 
reduced to a smaller number in such a way that all other connectives can be derived from the function-
ality of the remaining elements of this subset.44 In the case of the GPL, however, I do not see how the 
previously introduced set of connectives can be reduced. We have introduced it constructively, ie. suc-
cessively, because of considerations of what further formal operations are necessary to represent a pro-
cessual reality. I would not have introduced any of the subsequently introduced connectives if they 
could be represented using the already existing set of symbols. 
The GPL is thus compared with e.g. to the elementary propositional logic an elaborate system, be-
cause it requires a larger number of connectives and syntactic symbols than propositional logic. In com-
parison with other, more complex classical logical languages, however, the comparison is more moder-
ate. Extending the predicate logic by quantifiers and the usual modal-logical systems are not simpler in 
construction than the GPL. 
However, the notion of functional completeness has another meaning that goes beyond the simple 
reduction in the number of connectives. In multi-valued logical systems, it is questionable whether it is 
fundamentally possible to represent the n sentential connectives of such systems by a significant smaller 
amount or even by only one out of the set. In fact, Peter Markmann has recently been able to show that 
in every n-valued logical gate a central sentential connective can be determined, with the help of which, 
by means of numerous systematic transformations, all the other sentential connectives of such a gate 
can be represented.45 For the GPL, however, this is initially of no importance, since it does not work at 
all with values in terms of object language. The question of the functional completeness of the GPL is 
therefore to be answered in the negative insofar as it is not possible to reduce the amount of the 
                                                          
43 A very good overview of the amazing variety of such approaches is given by Priest [2001]. 
44 For elementary propositional logic, such a reduction is possible even on a single connective. This is called the 
Sheffer stroke. Within the 16 sentential connectives of the two-valued two-digit propositional logic, there are even 
two such Sheffer functions, namely the NAND and the NOR-connective. 
45 Still unpublished work. For more than two years, however, I have studied with him the systematics of transform-
ing n-valued logical gates and have shown him that each such gate can be represented by a single so-called key 
connective. 
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previously introduced set of connectives. On the other hand, the necessity of the functional complete-
ness proof in its classical form does not apply, if only because no truth values are used in the GPL. 
9.2 Consistency 
A logical system is free of contradictions if one cannot derive a true expression and at the same time its 
negation from a set of given expressions. However, this concept of consistency is not applicable to the 
GPL because it does not work with truth values. But in a somewhat weaker sense, consistency must also 
apply to calculi such as the GPL, in much the same way as we assume empirical reality to be consistent 
physically, biologically, etc. Such a consistency axiom underlies the entire modern concept of science. 
Not only does this term apply to the GPL, it also fulfills the corresponding requirement. Since all logic, 
and consequently also the GPL, are only epistemological tools, and consequently their expressions have 
no direct ontological claim to validity, it can only depend on the set of rules for the formation of well-
formed expressions, whether a logic is consistent or not. However, since the GPL does not use the truth 
values and thus the state logic kind of conclusions, the possibilities of forming inconsistent expressions 
are even smaller here than in the traditional logics. In fact, all those specific contradictions are elimi-
nated that can only occur in state logical systems based on the evaluation of their expressions. What is 
left are possible ambiguities in the syntax and rules of operation of the individual elements of the GPL. 
Although I have tried to be as unambiguous as possible, I cannot rule out the need for correction. How-
ever, this could always be done by appropriate amendments in the definition of the syntax and the ele-
mentary functions. 
I therefore think that the GPL can be characterized as consistent as long as no contradictions can be 
found and it can in principle be asserted that even if such contradictions occur, they can be remedied by 
a correction of their formal rules. 
11. Is the GPL a logic at all? 
In view of the essential deviations of the GPL in their basic forms and principles from the traditional 
logics - above all: the complete omission of bivalent or multivalent truth values of statements as the ba-
sis of the logical transformation and final evaluation - the question arises whether the GPL is about logic 
at all. An answer to this depends on what one explains to be the essence or the indispensable (categore-
matic) attributes of formal logical languages. Those who insist that formal logical languages must have 
exactly those features that have been deliberately abandoned here in favor of other possibilities will 
certainly deny that the GPL is a formal logic. However, there are good reasons not to submit to such 
dogmatism. 
The question of whether the GPL is a logic can only be answered by using a specific definition of the 
term 'formal logical language'. What at first looks like an unsolvable task, because it allows so many an-
swers, turns out eventually to be quite manageable, if we approach such a definition attempt in the re-
verse manner: what can a formal logical statement system certainly not be, simply for the reason that it 
simply cannot meet the expectations associated with it? From this negative perspective it turns out that 
a commonly used criterion for defining logic is in fact not good: it is often said that logic is the basis of 
the correct thinking.46 However, the attribute 'correct' in this context can mean two things: firstly, the 
purely formal inner consistency of a chain of linked statements, and, secondly, the validity of the evalua-
tions and conclusions of traditional logic that correspond ontologically with extralinguistic reality. How-
ever, the traditional logics only do the former, and so does the GPL. Hence there is no reason to deny 
the GPL its status as logic. As for the correspondence with extralinguistic reality, neither the traditional 
logics nor the GPL are able to do so or even to guarantee it. Formal statement systems are basically in-
different to extra-linguistic reality. No logic, neither the traditional species nor the GPL, can say 
                                                          
46 Here I use the term 'logic' as an abbreviation for 'formal logical language'. 
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something about extralinguistic reality. This was already the cardinal error of Anselm's “proof of God”, 
and G.E. Moore's “assertion”47 that a statement of fact never suggests its ethical quality applies in gen-
eral to any logical statement: what is logically conclusive, error-free, or in any other way formally valid 
does not say much about the ontological status of such a statement. Again, this criterion is not suitable 
for clarifying the question of whether the GPL is even a logic. 
But if the logic is not a direct empirical cognitive aid to knowledge, there is only one other explana-
tion why we value it so much. This explanation refers to a trend of the theories of meaning of language, 
which is commonly referred to as the 'usage and meaning theory' of language.48 According to this view 
of human language, one of its most influential representatives, Robert B. Brandom, is essentially con-
cerned with understanding how language serves as a means of creating symbolic, social commitment. In 
conversation, we can only persuade other people with the statements of fact that we claim to accept 
these allegations and to act in accordance with them if our presentation of the facts is sufficiently plausi-
ble. This is where logic comes into play as one of the most important tools for generating communica-
tive liability. Linguistic communication often involves a chain of innumerable concepts and implicit as-
sertions that cannot possibly be empirically verified in a concrete conversation. However, to be able to 
check a minimum of plausibility as the recipient of corresponding messages, we often have to restrict 
ourselves to examine only the internal consistency of the asserted statements. Exactly this is also a good 
candidate for the definition of formal logical statement systems in general: A logic is therefore any such 
system of formal statements that is suitable for such a plausibility check.  
Based on this criterion, I believe that the GPL, like the traditional logics, is a true formal language. 
The above criterion is also not too far: mathematics, for example, is by no means suitable in the compre-
hensive sense as formal-logical statement systems to prove the plausibility of common-language expres-
sions. At best, it meets this requirement in arithmetic assertions. However, further mathematical con-
structs in everyday communication are no tools for validating general statements. 
Another question is whether the GPL is more like the programming languages for digital processors. 
These are also formal languages, but not statement systems. Programming languages are rather com-
mand systems: they control the behavior of machines. To that end, they use the principles of formal 
logic, but only among other things. However, this is only a means for an altogether different, namely 
practical purpose. In this respect, it is the same with the GPL as it is with the traditional logic: it is not 
practically oriented, but it can easily be implemented in programming languages as well. In this sense, I 
am of the opinion, that the GPL is a fully-fledged formal-logical language. 
 
                                                          
47 See Moore [1996], p. 77ff. 
48 One of its most influential contemporary representatives is Robert B. Brandom, whom I greatly appreciate in this 
regard, see especially Brandom [1994]. 
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Appendix: List of symbols used in the GPL 
 
General symbols: 
P[x] Object with latent action potency 
& positive action operator (double-digit) 
Z negative action operator (double-digit) 
% positive action operator (one-digit) 
Y negative action operator (one-digit) 
… Continuity symbol 
f positive availability operator (one-digit, i.e. „creation“) 
d negative availability operator (one-digit, i.e. „demise“) 
 
Relationale Indikatoren: 
&R+/-  Subscript for the positive or negative reflexivity 
&K   Subscript for the Commutativity 
&D   Subscript for the Distributivity  
&-T   Subscript for the negation of Transitivity 
&- (<Kennzeichner>)  for the suspension of a relational labeling.  
Fusion / Split-uo: 
5 Fusion operator 
∅ Split-up operator 
 
Koppelungszeichen: 
ǀP  Change of the formal language to predicate logic 
ǀGPL  Change of the formal language to GPL 
